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UNIVERSITY ENDOWMENTS: A

(SURPRISINGLY) ELUSIVE CONCEPT
FRANCES R. HILL*

Abstract: Even as certain policy makers press for mandatory payouts from
endowments, the concept of an endowment remains surprisingly elusive. In
the absence of either operational concepts of endowments or well-established
metrics for identifying and measuring endowments, public policy discussions
proceed with an implicit model of an endowment as "money in waiting" that
is not currently in use for exempt educational purposes. This Article suggests
that endowments, however conceptualized or measured, are better
understood as "money in use" even though it is not being distributed. It
argues that most endowment money is currently in use for at least two
purposes. The earnings on endowments are funding both current operations
and long-term commitments. The endowment principle itself is used for
various forms of credit enhancement for numerous forms of university
borrowing. Because the endowment is in use, its distribution would have a
far greater impact than policy makers understand.
The Article also suggests that mandatory distributions would have little
impact on the public policy issue of access to education. Very few
universities have substantial endowments and even fewer have endowments
that could make a difference over the long term. Although Congress has the
authority to require mandatory distributions as a condition of continued tax
exemption, such a requirement has been used only in cases where there was
reason to doubt that various types of exempt entities are using their funds for
exempt activities. This is not the case with colleges and universities.
Recommendations for mandatory distributions do not address any problem
with the operation of colleges and universities for exempt purposes and do
not offer any realistic hope for a solution of the very serious problem of
financing the education and research mission of universities.

Professor of Law & Director, Graduate Program in Taxation, University of Miami School
of Law. Thanks to David Kramarz, a student in the Graduate Program in Taxation, for
research assistance. Thanks to Barbara Brandon, reference librarian at the University of
Miami Law Library, for research in legislative history.

NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44:581

Universities depend fundamentally on government funding in the form of
student loans and grants and contracts for research. Universities are
"parastatal" enterprises that are publicly funded but privately operated. Much
more research is needed on this aspect of university operations and on the
actual uses of the endowment that are inconsistent with distribution.
Imposing a mandatory distribution requirement on universities is not a
substitute for public policies that offer realistic prospects for addressing the
problems of access to education by students and adequate funding for
research on which our economy and society depend.
INTRODUCTION

Even before the Great Recession, the cost of a college education
meant that families made financial sacrifices and students assumed a debt
burden that would continue for much of their lives.1 Tuition increases
outpaced increases in the cost of living. 2 This burden on students and their
families did not translate into financial strength for colleges and
universities. 3 Colleges and universities of all types faced increased costs
that tuition revenue did not and could not defray. These institutions
embraced fund-raising and revenue-enhancing projects ranging from
affinity merchandising, to what they hoped would be high-yield investment
strategies, to increased lobbying for government support from state,
federal, and even local governments.
The economic downturn that became undeniably clear in September
2008 exacerbated the already substantial problems of students and their
families and created additional problems for universities as institutions.
The most obvious result of the economic downturn was the reduced return
on investments and the loss of invested principle virtually across the board.
Public universities lost state support as state tax revenues declined.4

1. For recent perspectives on concerns and discontent over the cost of higher education
for students and their families, see a joint study by PUBLIC AGENDA AND THE NAT'L CTR.
FOR PUB. POLICY & HIGHER ED., SQUEEZE PLAY 2010: CONTINUED PUBLIC ANXIETY ON

COST,

HARSHER

JUDGMENTS

ON How

COLLEGES ARE

RUN

(2010),

available

at

http://www.publicagenda.org/pages/squeeze-play-2010. For a discussion of the study and of
the issues it addresses, see Tamar Lewin, Study Finds Public Discontent with Colleges, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2010, at All, available at www.nytimes.com/2010/02/17/education/17
college.html.
2. Questions of financing the education mission and the implications for students are
analyzed in BURTON A. WEISBROD, JEFFREY P. BALLOU & EVELYN

D. ASCH,

MISSION AND

MONEY: UNDERSTANDING THE UNIVERSITY (2008).

3. See id.at 77-86.
4. In addition to quite important reports from particular universities and colleges,
NACUBO has made available its annual survey of endowments for the period June 1, 2008 -
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Access to both public and private universities was limited as
universities faced the need to delay building plans to expand both facilities
and faculty. Community colleges reported being unable to serve the needs
of current students or to enroll qualified new students. Even elite
universities with large endowments announced cutbacks in student aid,
including their recently announced programs to offer need-blind
admissions.
The Great Recession also meant that research universities, including
Harvard, had to scale back plans for new facilities to expand both teaching
and research in the sciences. While the government finances much of the
research conducted at universities, government financing was not enough
in the face of reduced university resources.
Even before the Great Recession, some in Congress raised the
possibility of requiring universities to distribute some portion of their
endowment earnings to increase financial aid for students. This is an
appealing proposal for students, their families, and policy-makers. It holds
out the possibility of solving a very serious problem with a policy of
redistribution that will not require greater government investment, greater
student indebtedness, or greater burdens on American families.
Congress has the authority to require this kind of distribution by taxexempt universities as one of the requirements for their exempt status. The
difficult question is what such a requirement might in fact achieve. This
Article does not answer this question. Indeed, the question cannot be
satisfactorily answered with current data. This Article focuses on a
conceptual framework for thinking about endowments, engaging in
research on endowments, and developing policy proposals relating to
endowments.
The concept of a university endowment is surprisingly elusive.5 There
are neither concepts of an endowment nor operational definitions of
endowments. Further, there are no methods for empirical measurements of
endowments using commonly accepted or statutorily defined metrics. In
addition, there is a lack of information about which colleges and
universities have endowments, however measured, as well as how
universities that do have endowments in fact use them. It is not surprising
that these empirical and conceptual lacunae are interrelated. These
conceptual and empirical lacunae become particularly important in
discussions of policy proposals that begin with premises about what is not

June 30, 2009 at its website, http://www.nacubo.org/documents/researchl2009_NCSEPress

_Release.pdf.
5. Henry Hansman, Why Do Universities Have Endowments?, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 3
(1990) expresses skepticism about maintaining substantial endowments for any reason but
concludes that too little is known about endowments to make any recommendations.
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yet known and proceed to strong recommendations about distributions from
endowments.
This Article begins with a discussion of two general models of
endowments. These models shape the general discussion of endowments
that follows. Part II raises the question of what types of colleges and
universities have endowments and what information is available regarding
the size of endowments. Part III raises the question of how endowments are
used and discusses the need for better data and more empirical research on
this issue. Part IV considers whether mandatory distribution requirement
would serve as an effective public policy lever. Part V asks whether tax law
principles provide a basis for mandatory distributions from university
endowments. The Article concludes by asking what we might learn about
exempt entities and the larger issues of exempt status by considering the
policy debate over endowments. The Article concludes that the policy
leverage that various government officials and commentators have sought
by addressing endowments is illusory. This does not mean that addressing
these issues is beside the point, only that doing so may well-address a
different point. Although at first we find that we think we are dealing with
exempt entities in the "independent sector," in the end we find that we are
dealing with one enterprise dependent on government financing for both
student financial aid and grants and contracts for research. No university
has an endowment large enough to alter this fact. The only thing that
differs is the degree of dependence. Endowments are useful, but tuition and
government support for research are fundamental. Universities are
parastatal enterprises heavily dependent on government funding, including,
but by no means limited to, exemption from taxation and the deduction
available to contributors.
I. Endowments: Models and Their Analytical Implications
Various members of Congress have begun and ended their
discussions of endowments with various recommendations and
prescriptions relating to distributional issues. This is not a useful place to
begin-and may not be a useful place to end.6 The focus here is why
distribution is not a useful place to begin. The more logical and useful
place to begin is with two questions: What is an endowment? Why does the
answer matter?
Two unarticulated models of an endowment seem to pervade
discussions. The first is the model of an endowment as a reserve account
that is not being used. An endowment is "money in waiting," found money,
6. For an insightful analysis of why time value of money concepts are not analytically
useful in the discussion of payout rates from exempt entities' endowments, see Michael
Klausner, When Time Isn't Money, STAN. SOC. SC. INNOVATION REv., Spring 2003, at 51.
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a pot of gold at the beginning of a rainbow that is expected to end in a new
and better day. The second model of an endowment is a sum of money that
produces income that is allocated to current uses and, in some cases, very
likely to multiple uses in long-term budgeting and in securing university
borrowing, including bond indentures and other debt covenants. This is a
''money in use" model of endowments.
The first model, "money in waiting," makes discussions about
distributions both simple and a pressing moral imperative. An endowment
is a simple concept. Under this model one need ask only how much money
is in the endowment and then make a case for various uses. The money in
waiting model simply assumes all of the relevant facts and treats all of the
relevant questions as already answered. This model does not provide an
analytical framework or help to define research priorities. This is not a
model for inquiry, but a model that assumes the time for inquiry is past, if it
ever existed. A slightly more useful variant of this model focuses on when
distribution should take place, with a debate over current distribution or
some consideration for the future might be appropriate. While these
questions are important operationally, they cannot be insightfully addressed
based on a distributional framework. The central fallacy in the money in
waiting model is to equate the use of the endowment with distribution from
the endowment. The second model is based on the premise that an
endowment is being used even though money is not being distributed from
it.
The second model, "money in use," treats an endowment as working
capital even though the principle will not be currently distributed. It takes
account of the current use of endowment earnings to fund operations. It
calls for research focused on university operations and on the operation of
the financial markets in which the university must operate to raise capital.
It leads to questions about the role of government in providing direct and
indirect financial support for universities. It makes discussions about
distributions difficult and contingent. Because the endowment is already in
use, the discussion focuses not on distribution but on re-allocation. This
model of endowments leads to the kinds of questions that should guide
both the management of individual institutions and public policy
discussions.
The market downturn that became undeniable in late 2008 has made
life more difficult for students, faculty, and administrators. Perversely, it
should prove useful in persuading both analysts and public officials to
reconsider their certainty about the usefulness of the "money in waiting"
model and to take another look at the "money in use" model.
There can be no better case studies than Harvard and Yale, the
universities with the largest endowments. Both have candidly announced
significant cutbacks in their operating budgets and in major projects and
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have issued updates to their alumni and the public. Neither has made any
effort to claim that their programs of student aid and building funds and
compensation for administrators, staff, and faculty are unaffected. No one
claims that either university will cease to fund classroom education and
research. But it is noteworthy that Harvard, to the amusement of many, has
lent its good name to a line of clothing that no one who has ever attended
Harvard is likely to wear. Monetizing reputational capital is not a broadly
applicable solution and may be a bad idea even for Harvard.
Senator Grassley, the ranking member of the Senate Finance
Committee, set forth his version of the "money in waiting" model of
university endowments in the following terms:
Tuition has gone up, college presidents' salaries have gone up,
and endowments continue to go up and up. We need to start
seeing tuition relief for families go up just as fast. It's fair to ask
whether a college kid should have to wash dishes in the dining
hall to pay his tuition when his college has a billion dollars in the
bank. 9
Senator Grassley characterized donor restrictions on use as "an
excuse to hoard rather than spend the money."'' 0 He observed that "[a]s we
say in the nation's capital, money is fungible." "I
In early 2010, Senator Grassley reminded everyone that he regards
endowments as a solution to a problem and the mere fact of the loss of
value in endowments is no barrier to increased distributions. As he stated in
his press release issued at the same time as the most recent report on2
endowments, "[a] lot of colleges still have plenty of money in the bank.'
An endowment appears to be a policy lever that will address important

7. See, e.g., Kathryn Masterson, Yale Says Budget Cuts Needed After 25-PercentDrop
in Endowment, THE CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Dec. 16, 2008; Kathryn Masterson, A
Sobering Message from Harvard's President, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., November 21,
2008.
8. Laurie Fendrich, My Khakis Went to Harvard,CHRON.OF HIGHER EDUC., August 7,

2009.
9. Press Release, Sen. Charles Grassley, Stanford's Student Aid Spending May Be
Latest Trend, Small Iowa College Offers Examples of Commitment to Students (Feb. 20,
2008), availableat http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfn?customel-dataPagelD_1502
=8473.
10. Charles E. Grassley, Commentary, Wealthy Colleges Must Make Themselves More
Affordable, THE CHRON.OF HIGHER EDUC., May 30, 2008, at A36.
11. Id
12. Press Release, Sen. Charles Grassley, Students, Families Shouldn't Bear Brunt of
College Endowment Losses, (Jan. 27, 2010), available at http://grassley.senate.gov/news
/Article.c fm?customeldataPagelD_ 1502=24983.
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socio-economic-cultural imperatives at no inconvenience to government
officials.
Some, including Senator Grassley, have attempted to salvage the
primacy of the "money in waiting" model by blaming universities for
engaging in risky investment strategies. Senator Grassley said in his
January 27, 2010 press release:
I hope colleges won't rely on double-digit losses as a reason to
raise tuition or freeze student aid. Many of them relied on some
risky investments, like hedge funds, to get big gains in recent
years, and now those strategies are causing losses. Students
shouldn't bear the 3 brunt of colleges' easy-come, easy-go
investment strategy.'
The press release makes no mention of congressional approval of
deregulation of financial institutions or Congress's ready agreement with at
least two administrations that financial products and purveyors of the more
exotic products should not be regulated. There certainly were bad decisions
made by universities as well as by all other investors, but these individual
failures do not explain the economic crisis and its pervasive effects.
Models are heuristics that highlight elements of a phenomenon and
posit relationships among the elements of a phenomenon. Models are
elements in building theories and in designing research. Here, the two
models of endowments highlight research agendas beginning with the
question of how many and what kinds of colleges and universities have
endowments, however they are described, measured, or used. The next Part
discusses the distribution of endowments, which is analytically prior to any
discussion of the distributions from endowments.
II. The Distribution of Endowments
The National Association of College and University Business Officers
("NACUBO") provides an annual survey of college and university
endowments. 14 All analyses of endowments rely on these data. NACUBO
13.Id.
14. See the NACUBO, Public NCSE Tables, http://www.nacubo.org/Research/
NACUBOEndowment Study/Public NCSETables_.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). The
survey for fiscal year 2009 is the first survey prepared jointly by NACUBO and the
Commonfund Institute, which had prepared a separate Commonfund Study of Endowments
(NCSE). Press Release, NACUBO-NCSE, NACUBO-Commonfund Press Release on the
2009 Endowment Study Results 1 (Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://www.nacubo.org/
findings
The
Research/NACUBOEndowment Study/PublicNCSETables_.html.
available to the public without charge for fiscal year 2009, which covers July 1, 2008 to
June 30, 2009, are available at http://www.nacubo.org/Research/NACUBOEndowment
_Study/PublicNCSETables_.html.
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represents over 2100 colleges and universities. Its annual survey of
endowments includes 756 colleges and universities. In her important
analysis of endowments, Jane Gravelle of the Congressional Research
Service concludes that limiting the NACUBO survey to 756 colleges and
universities suggests that other colleges and universities have "negligible
endowments.' 5 This in itself suggests that endowments are heavily
concentrated in a relatively small percentage of colleges and universities.
Endowments are largest in the private research universities, lead by
Harvard and followed by Yale, Stanford, and Princeton. The largest
endowments are measured in billions of dollars. Before the Great
Recession, Harvard's endowment was approximately $35 billion, Yale's
was $23 billion, Stanford's was $17 billion and Princeton's was $16
billion. The tenth ranked school, Notre Dame, had an endowment of $6
billion, which is certainly a large number, but only seventeen percent of
Harvard's endowment.
The smallest endowments before the Great Recession were measured
in the millions of dollars, with the ten private colleges with the smallest
endowments ranging from approximately $9 million to approximately $6
million.
Jane Gravelle concluded that "[e]ndowment assets are heavily
concentrated in a few institutions with large endowments.'' 16 She found that
Harvard alone accounted for 8.5% of the total endowments of the 756
schools included in the NACUBO survey. 17 The top five schools accounted
for twenty-five percent of the total endowment of the 756 schools but less
than one percent of those schools. 18 The top twenty universities accounted
for almost half of the total endowment value but were less than three
percent of the 756 colleges and universities surveyed, 9 and less than one
percent of the total number of colleges and universities represented by
NACUBO. Finally, Gravelle found that the sixty-two colleges and
universities with endowments exceeding $1 billion make up eight percent

15. Memorandum from Jane G. Gravelle, Senior Specialist in Economic Policy,
Government and Finance Division, Congressional Research Service, to Honorable Max
Baucus, Chairman, Senate Committee on Finance & Honerable Chuck Grassley, Ranking
Member, Senate Finance Committee on Finance 3 n.2 (Aug. 20, 2007), available at
http://grassley.senate.gov/releases/2008/01142008.pdf. The Congressional Research Service
does not make its reports available to the public but the Reports are not confidential and are
routinely cited.
16. Id. at 1. This is based on data from the fiscal year ending on June 30, 2006.
17. Id.
18.Id.
19. Id.
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of the 756 colleges and universities in the survey but account for two-thirds
of the total endowment value.20
Burton Weisbrod and his colleagues studied whether management
strategies varied with the size of the endowment. It might be reasonable to
hypothesize that universities with the largest endowments took more risks
because they could absorb losses, while schools with the smallest
endowments would seek to protect their principle or could not afford
investment advice that took them into the newer, more exotic and riskier
21
investments. Weisbrod found that even colleges with smaller endowments
determined that they needed the larger returns that come with higher risks.
The preliminary results from the fiscal year 2009 NACUBO survey
found that colleges and universities experienced substantial losses during
the period of June 1, 2008 to June 20, 2009.22 The overall decline in value
was twenty-three percent.23 At the same time, colleges and universities
experienced rising institutional debt, with the universities holding the
largest endowments also carrying the highest median long-term debt
levels.2 4 Colleges and universities with the smallest endowments also
carried the smallest median long-term debt. 25 It appears likely that schools
with smaller endowments experienced difficulty obtaining credit. Overall,
the median debt level increased from $28.3 million in fiscal year 2008 to
$44.3 million in fiscal year 2009, which is a fifty-seven percent increase in
one year.26
The studies of endowments make it clear, if only by negative
inference, that community colleges operate outside the world of
endowments and controversies over endowments. Any serious effort to
address the problem of access to higher education must address the
financial challenges of community colleges and the students who attend
them.

20. Id. at 1-2.

21.

WEISBROD,

supra note 2, at 132-38.

22. Kenneth E. Redd, Buffeted by Economic Headwinds, Bus. OFFICER MAG., Mar.
2010, http://www.nacubo.org/BusinessOfficerMagazine/MagazineArchives/March20
10/Buffeted byEconomic_Headwinds.html.
23. Id.
24. See id. The median debt for institutions with the largest endowments was $863.1
million. Id.
25. Id. The median debt for institutions with the smallest endowments was $15.8
million. Id.
26. Id. The median debt for institutions with the smallest endowments was $15.8
million. Id.
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III. Uses of Endowments: Issues in Measurement and Analysis
The model of an endowment as "money-in-waiting," a readily
available reserve fund, is inconsistent with analyses of uses of endowments
as a regular part of college or university operations. The question would be,
what conditions might cause a university to dip into this reserve or what
kinds of new initiatives might first be funded by endowment reserves.
Research would not focus primarily on the current use of endowments.
Policy disputes would center on whether either the earnings or the principal
of an endowment should ever be used and, if they are used, what kinds of
uses are consistent with both sound management and the university's
mission. The very idea of an endowment might be thought to be
inconsistent with distribution.
The model of an endowment as money in use with particular
restrictions and limitations makes research more insightful and policy,
ultimately, more effective. The main problem in determining how
endowments are used is the lack of systematic data on any element of
endowments. Jane Gravelle highlighted this problem in her report on
endowments.27 She reported that information on how endowments are used
"is currently voluntary, not always available, and not available in an
accessible form., 28 She further observed, "[n]or
are measures in place to
29
assure that data are accurate and consistent.,
The concept of the use of an endowment is distinguishable from the
issue of distributions from an endowment. The existence of an endowment
appears to facilitate borrowing by a university. As discussed at the end of
this section, a variety of credit enhancement mechanisms are consistent
with current law and these mechanisms appear to be used by the betterendowed universities. In addition, the earning from the endowment are part
of the regular budget process of most universities. The former president of
George Washington University referred to tenure as a bet made by a
university that will require that earnings on a stated amount of capital in the
endowment be dedicated to paying for that tenure line for the anticipated
professional life of the tenured professor. Distributing that amount of
capital from the endowment would require that some other source of
earnings be identified to pay for the fixed expense of every tenure line in
the university budget. The same is true of maintenance and other fixed
costs. The concept of an endowment as money in use and the realization

27. Memorandum from Jane Gravelle to Honorable Max Baucus & Honorable Chuck
Grassley, supranote 15, at 14-15.
28. Id. at 14.
29. Id.
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that use does not necessarily mean distribution at the very least points to
more insightful research about university finance.
Current data on the uses of endowments do not capture much of the
reality of endowment use. Form 990 now requires that colleges and
universities report the amount of their endowments. 30 These changes to
Form 990 were finalized and became effective after Ms. Gravelle had
completed her report. Under the new reporting requirements on the revised
Form 990, the organization is required to report its beginning of the year
balance. It is then required to report contributions, investment earnings or
losses, grants or scholarships, other expenditures for facilities and
programs, administrative expenses, and the year-end balance. Part 2 of
Schedule D, Part V requires information on the estimated percentage and
balance held in the following three categories: board designated or quasiendowment, permanent endowment, and term endowment. Part XIV,
Supplemental Information, requires a narrative of the "intended uses of the
organization's endowment funds." Part 3a of Schedule D, Part V requires
information about the "endowment funds not in the possession of the
organization that are held and administered for the organization" by
unrelated organizations and related organizations.
These questions are potentially quite useful. They should provide
information about the apparently common use by public universities of
controlled § 501(c)(3) organizations created and maintained to finance
expenditures that state legislatures have proved unwilling or unable to fund.
Faculty salary supplements are one common use for the amounts raised
through controlled § 501(c)(3) organizations.
These questions might also provide information on such structures as
Harvard's Management Company, but it is not clear that any of these
management companies in fact hold the funds rather than advise on their
investment.
This Schedule should provide information not previously available
publicly. Current studies of endowments have been conducted by a
nonprofit with a proprietary interest in the material that charges a fee for
access to most of the data and its analysis. Public availability in itself
should facilitate research and policy analysis.
At the same time, there is no statutory predicate that provides
comparability in the reports. The terms used are not statutory terms and
there is no development of regulations guiding the reporting. The issue is
not that the government does not have the authority to collect this

30. IRS Schedule D (Form 990), Supplemental Financial Statements, Part V,
Endowment Funds (OMB No. 1545-0047) (2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/f990.pdf Filing of this form is required if the organization answers "Yes" to Form 990,
Part IV, line 10.
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information, nor is the issue that organizations will lie, although the
reporting positions of some organizations may come uncomfortably close
to a lie and unacceptably far from any concept of an endowment. The issue
is that there is no way to tell how organizations are allocating funds to their
endowments. It is certainly true that all tax returns are based on selfreporting, but the Internal Revenue Code and the applicable regulations
provide constraints on interpretation and a basis for determining the
acceptability of responses. There are no such restraints in the reporting of
endowments in Schedule D, Part V.
The Instructions to Schedule D provide some guidance that is
apparently intended to be consistent with current practice in reporting to the
private entities that currently track endowments. The lack of conceptual
constraint on these ideas applied to particular cases is widely noted. The
Instructions also note that accounting standards may affect what is
reported. At first blush this might seem unremarkable. Yet, it is quite
interesting as a departure from the tax principle that accounting concepts do
not control tax reporting. This raises questions about an information return.
There is no analogous concept of deference to other statutes in such areas
as political activity of exempt entities. The Instructions contain no
reference to federal election law, and the extensive reporting requirements
applicable under Federal Election Commission regulations.
As is discussed more fully below in the discussions of policy levers,
the anomalies of Schedule D, Part V could have greater operational
importance if Congress mandates particular uses of endowments and
enforces these legislative requirements through excise taxes. In this case,
the malleability of definitions would become a serious problem for a tax
regime. Colleges and universities would, quite quickly and, one presumes,
quite legally, find ways to exclude money from funds that fall within the
definition of a fund subject to the tax.
The Senate Finance Committee Roundtable devoted a panel to the
question, "What Is an Endowment?" This panel has received little press
coverage but should engage our attention. The bottom line point was made
by John Mattie, a partner at PricewaterhouseCoopers, who discussed the
use of different definitions for endowments by institutions and regulators
and the difficulty this poses for policies relating to endowments. 31 He
further remarked that aggregating restricted funds in an endowment makes
sense for reporting purposes but does not enhance transparency because it
can lead to the mistaken view that restrictions do not matter.
Jeff Mechanick, a Financial Accounting Standards Board project
manager, discussed FAS 117-1, which provides guidance on reporting and
classifying donor-restricted endowment funds and the requirements that
31. See the summary of the September 8, 2008 roundtable at www.case.org.
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apply even if the state has not yet adopted the Uniform Prudent
Management of Institutional Funds Act ("UPMIFA"). He, too, emphasized
the heterogeneity of college and university concepts of endowments.
To a tax lawyer, this means that the base amount of a five-percent
payout rate is not a stable concept and that considerable issues remain to be
addressed in making this an operational concept. Jane Gravelle of the
Congressional Research Service asked the critical question of the
accountants. She asked whether, if Congress enacted the proposed
mandatory payout, colleges and universities could shift funds to accounts
that are not considered part of the endowment. Both accountants replied
that this would be possible. Both also stated that many colleges and
universities invest non-endowment funds with endowment funds.
Even if these issues relating to the definition and measurement of an
endowment were to be resolved in a way that created a stable,
administrable reporting regime, this would not permit an informed decision
about mandatory distributions. Any serious effort to develop a proposal for
requiring distributions from college and university endowments would
require a serious study of how educational institutions are using their
endowments. This kind of study would not conflate use with distribution.
The possibility of use without distribution is rarely considered and no data
are available on this concept of use of an endowment. Critical questions
would be whether, to what extent, and in what ways endowments enable in
loan documents, and whether mandatory distributions would be
inconsistent with these credit enhancement mechanisms.
These questions are not discussed for two main reason. One is that
research would require going beyond the NACUBO data and the data that
will now be publicly available on Form 990 and actually persuade
universities to allow researchers to examine their credit agreements and
other relevant documents. This would not be an easy task.32 It may well call
for collaborative research between exempt organization lawyers and
lawyers specializing in finance. The second reason is that tax lawyers are
inclined to believe that universities and other exempt entities borrow only
by issuing bonds and that tax law imposes prohibitive taxes on the use of
endowment funds to support bond issues. This is an easier barrier to
overcome because it is simply incorrect. An April 2010 report from the
Congressional Budget Office supports the broad concept of use without
distribution discussed here and helps clarify the law in this area.33 Colleges

32. Henry Hansmann, supra note 5, at 3 n.*, in the introductory note reported that "The
Yale University Treasurer's Office gave generous assistance in interpreting the university's
financial records." It is unclear precisely what records were involved, but very few
researchers have sought such access and very few entities have responded cooperatively.
33. See generally CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, TAX ARBITRAGE BY COLLEGES AND
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and universities with large endowments also tend to borrow by issuing taxexempt bonds. This results in "tax arbitrage" when the rate the universities
pay on the bonds issued is less than the rate earned on the endowment.
Section 148 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, addresses
"arbitrage bonds" by imposing yield restrictions through a "replacement
proceeds" analysis. However, as the CBO Study notes, this system does not
work well and affords numerous opportunities for circumvention. The CBO
points out:
Because financial statements typically do not report the use of
particular assets as collateral, the replacement proceeds rule is
difficult to enforce. In addition, if assets are not specifically
pledged to pay the debt service on a tax-exempt bond or if the
assets have no other direct connection to the bonds, the arbitrage
restrictions do not apply. However, it is widely recognized that
assets and their earnings can be used to pay the interest on debt
or to cover other expenses to free up funds for interest payments,
regardless of whether they are directly pledged to do so. Such
use of higher-yielding assets 34to finance tax-exempt debt
constitutes indirect tax arbitrage.
The CR0 also observed that "[i]t is also standard practice for rating
agencies to base credit ratings for a particular debt issue on all available
assets, not just on those directly pledged to that debt issue."
These uses of the endowment are likely to be widespread. Universities
do not borrow only through tax-exempt bonds. Like any other large
enterprise, universities have cash management strategies and various lines
of credit from a variety of lenders. The uses of the endowment in relation to
these credit arrangements have yet to be researched and analyzed and taken
into account in public policy discussions.
IV. Would Distribution Requirements Serve as an Effective Public Policy
Lever?
Distribution requirements might be considered important from at least
two perspectives. First, requiring distributions might rationally be
considered evidence that colleges and universities are operating for their
exempt purpose of education.35 Second, a distribution requirement might be

UNIVERSITIES (2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/l12xx/docl1226/04-30TaxArbitrage.pdf.
34. Id. at 7.
35. For a discussion of the enumerated exempt purposes in § 501(c)(3), including
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targeted to address a broader public policy issue. In this case, the escalating
cost of higher education in the global economy depends increasingly on
well-educated workers for all sectors of the service economy at the very
time that students and families have difficulty paying the costs of
education. It should not be necessary to observe that this is a broad and
fundamental issue. It is certainly an issue .that extends well beyond the
question of requiring that colleges and universities distribute a prescribed
portion of their endowments annually. In this sense, a minimum
distribution requirement for colleges and universities is akin to the
community benefit standard for hospitals. In that long-running controversy
as well, the issue of whether exempt entities are operating to provide a
public benefit has been conflated with the issue of using exempt entities to
solve difficult public policy issues. Conflating a public benefit requirement
with a public policy response does not produce useful public policy
proposals. Indeed, calls for mandatory distributions from endowments may
impede, whether intentionally or unintentionally, serious efforts to craft
public policies.
The controversy over the community-benefit standard and exempt
hospitals differs from the controversy over minimum distribution
requirements for colleges and universities in ways that help explain the
distinction between the public-benefit concept and the public policy
concept. Health care is not an enumerated exempt purpose in section
501(c)(3).3 6 This means that hospitals that choose to operate as exempt
entities will rely on charity as their exempt purpose. An element within the
definition of charity is relief of the poor and distressed. This means that
exempt hospitals are initially required to satisfy a charity care standard that,
over time, became a more inclusive community benefit standard. In
addition to showing that they operate exclusively, which has come to be
defined as primarily, for a public benefit, exempt hospitals also have to
satisfy a separate community-benefit standard. It is scarcely surprising that
confusion and controversy ensues. The community benefit standard is part
of the public-benefit requirement for exemption. No one has been willing
to argue expressly that the profound issues surrounding health care would
be solved if exempt hospitals provided more community care or if a more
stringent charity care or community-benefit requirement were imposed as a
condition for exemption. In sum, the controversy over exempt hospitals is
whether they are exempt and what criteria should be applied to make this
determination.
The controversy over proposals for a university endowment
distribution requirement is not in response to questions of whether colleges
36. For a discussion of the community benefit standard and exempt status for hospitals,

see id. at 1 3.02[5] and 29.04[3].
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and universities are operating for an exempt purpose. It is instead a
controversy over how to increase access to the exempt activity in which
colleges and universities are clearly engaged. It is a controversy over the
underlying public policy issue of supporting basic research and developing
a workforce equipped to contribute to the economy of the twenty-first
century. Put in the broadest possible terms, this is a controversy over the
relative responsibilities of students and their families, colleges and
universities, and the American people acting through their government to
ensure that education is broadly available. The question then becomes not
whether a distribution requirement for more financial assistance for
students would solve the underlying problem, but whether it would
contribute meaningfully to it. The other question is whether public
officials' focus on the duty of the colleges and universities themselves
serves a useful public policy purpose, or whether it simply obscures the
insufficiency of the government's contribution to ensuring that universities
can operate efficiently to help students gain access to higher education.
What might a distribution requirement achieve?
The previous discussion of the limited number of colleges and
universities that have endowments of any meaningful size; the idea that
endowment funds are not a reserve but are funds already in use to sustain
universities' education missions; and the lessons that appear to be emerging
from the experience with the Great Recession, all suggest that a mandatory
distribution requirement would have a limited impact. The absence of a
statutory definition of an endowment for tax purposes also suggests that
administering such a requirement might prove challenging in ways that
would limit the requirement's effectiveness.
Jane Gravelle's 2007 memorandum has been widely cited and, in
some cases, misunderstood. 37 It is important to note that the data used for
this study was for the fiscal year ending in June 2006.3 She concluded,
based on her sample, that a fairly minimal increase in endowment payouts
by the institutions in her sample would alleviate the pressure of tuition
increases, but she was very careful to state that this conclusion applied to
the twenty universities and ten liberal arts universities with the largest
endowments. 39 She also concluded that the results were "not as
pronounced" for the sixty-two institutions with endowments of over $1
billion, but, here too, increased payouts could replace tuition increases and
"increase[] student aid significantly. ' 4° That is the good news. This good

37. See generally Memorandum from Jane Gravelle to Honorable Max Baucus &
Honorable Chuck Grassley, supra note 15.

38.Id.
39.1d. at2.
40. Id.
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news must be put in the context of the heavy concentration of endowment
funds.41
The news about endowments became decidedly more mixed in
subsequent years. As discussed in Part II, the Great Recession resulted in
substantial declines in endowment values and increases in debt held by
colleges and universities. As discussed in Part III, colleges and universities
experienced liquidity crises during the Great Recession. Many universities
increased their endowment spending, including public universities that
required amendments to state laws permitting them to do so. These
developments suggest that the current understanding of the uses of
endowments may well be incomplete and, thus, somewhat misleading.
Liquidity issues and increased borrowing by universities with large
endowments suggest that such universities were acting in response to
constraints on current use of their endowments. One possible explanation is
that endowments are used not simply for expenditures that can be traced,
but also for credit enhancement provisions that support borrowing or that
support favorable rates on borrowing by their students. If endowments fall
below levels required in these credit enhancement clauses or student loan
rate agreements, default clauses or other clauses requiring substitution of
collateral may take effect. These possibilities suggest that policy proposals
relating to mandatory distributions would benefit from greater information
about this kind of use of endowments in sustaining college and university
operations.
Proposals for mandatory distributions from endowments do not seem
likely to address the high cost of access to higher education or the high
costs of operating colleges and universities. At the same time, it is difficult
to argue that colleges and universities are not operating for an exempt
purpose. Even if one could identify universities with large endowments that
are using a smaller percentage for student financial aid than are universities
with small endowments, it would be difficult to argue that they are serving
educational purposes less effectively than those schools using a slightly
larger percentage of their endowment for student aid. In other words, there
are well-founded reasons for scepticism that mandatory distributions from
endowments are either meaningfully related to serving an exempt
educational purpose or to addressing the larger underlying public policy
issue. Conflating the public policy issue with the exemption standard serves
only to confuse both issues. The most serious result of such confusion is to
divert attention from the duty of the public, acting through their
government, by holding out a hollow promise offering only an illusory
solution to the problem of access to higher education.

41. See supra Part II.
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V. Do Tax Concepts Support the Concept of Mandatory Distributions?
Nothing in the Internal Revenue Code42 compels any particular level
of distributions from college and university endowments. However, certain
provisions have been invoked in support of current proposals for
mandatory distributions from college and university endowments, making
brief discussions of these provisions helpful in addressing the issue of
whether tax law requires distributions as a condition of exempt status.
The private foundation provisions include a mandatory distribution
requirement that has been invoked in the discussion of mandatory
distributions from college and university endowments. Section 4942
imposes a tax on undistributed income 43 and defines undistributed income
in terms of investment earnings. 44 The minimum distribution requirement
does not apply to private operating foundations.45 The private foundation
provisions also include an excise tax on net investment income.4 6 This
provision, too, contains an exception for private operating foundations.4 7
The private-foundation provisions reflect concerns that private
foundations were operating for the benefit of the contributors who control
them. The central distinction between private foundations and public
charities, like colleges and universities, is the limited number of
contributors to private foundations. Because there are no prohibitions on
having the contributors serve on the boards of the private foundations, the
fear is that the private foundation will serve the interests of the contributors
who also control the board of directors. There are similar concerns with
other provisions applicable to private foundations but not to public
charities.4 8 The § 4946 conflict of interest provisions applicable to private
foundations prohibit certain transactions rather than focusing on whether
the pricing of these transactions between an exempt organization and
disqualified persons are conducted on the basis of reasonable prices.
The pricing of these transactions is part of a larger discussion of the
relation between private foundations and public charities. This discussion

42. See generally Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (codified at 26 U.S.C.

§

1 et seq).
43. I.R.C. § 4942(a)-(b) (2006).
44. § 4942(c)-(d).
45. § 4942(j)(3).
46. § 4940, which is discussed in detail in HILL & MANCINO, supra note 35, at 12.02.
47. § 4940(d).
48. See the excess business holdings of § 4943, which are discussed in HILL &
MANCINO, supra note 35, at
12.03; the jeopardizing investment provisions of § 4944,
which are discussed in HILL & MANCINO, supra note 35, at 12.04; and the self-dealing
provisions of §§ 4941, 4946, which are discussed in HILL & MANCINO, supra note 35, at
Chapter 10.
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has centered on the application of § 4958 excess-benefit transactions to
private foundations in place of the restrictive self-dealing concepts. 49 The
general trend of the discussion suggests that private foundations should be
able to avail themselves of the facts-and-circumstance approach of the
excess-benefit-transaction provisions applicable to § 501(c)(3) public
charities and § 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations. Whether this
suggestion has merit in terms of appropriate requirements for exempt status
is beyond the scope of this essay. What is clear is that provisions applicable
to private foundations limit conceptual utility when applied to public
charities that do not operate in the context of the kind of contributor control
that accounts for most of the private foundation provisions.
The Pension Protection Act of 200650 directed Treasury to promulgate
regulations requiring certain supporting organizations to make mandatory
distributions to the supported organization to which they are not
functionally related. 5 1 The proposed regulations are modeled on the private
foundation minimum distribution requirements.5 2 The purpose of this
payout requirement is to ensure that the non-functionally related supporting
organization distributes sufficient amounts to sustain its claim to exempt
status based on its relationship with the supported organization. This is a
very different purpose than the purpose of addressing a public policy issue
of access to education. There is no question that colleges and universities
are operating for an exempt educational purpose.
Taxable entities are also subject to a limited number of provisions
designed to prevent excess accumulation of earnings. The concern here is
that corporations will become unregulated mutual fids that operate
primarily by investing retained earnings and do not distribute their earnings
to their shareholders, thereby avoiding the shareholder-level tax. Section
532(a) imposes a tax on accumulated earnings. Section 533 provides that
this accumulated earnings tax applies only to earnings and profits
accumulated "beyond the reasonable needs of the business." This standard
has provoked a wide range of disputes between corporate taxpayers and the
I.R.S., but the I.R.S. has been, in general, quite receptive to arguments
establishing a reasonable business purpose for the accumulation of earnings

49. The private-benefit doctrines, including the § 4958 excess-benefit transaction rules,
applicable to public charities are discussed in HILL & MANCINO, supra note 35, at Chapter 4.
50. Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1241(d)(1), 120 Stat. 789.
51. See I.R.C. § 509(a)(3)(B). For a discussion of supporting organizations, see HILL &
MANCINO, supra note 35, at 8.06.
52. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.509(a)-4. The proposed regulations have attracted substantial
adverse comment. See, e.g., ABA Members Comment on Proposed Regs on Type I1
Supporting OrganizationQualifications, TAx NOTES TODAY, Apr. 29, 2010, 2010 TNT 82-
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and profits. The second provision is the personal-holding-company tax of §
541, which is more likely to be imposed in the case of small, closely held
corporations.
Colleges and universities do not present the same concern that the
entity will avoid distributing earnings to shareholders in an effort to avoid
taxation at the shareholder level. Exempt organizations do not have
shareholders with a right to receive dividend distributions. In addition,
these provisions do not seem designed to serve the underlying public policy
goal of increasing access to education.
CONCLUSION: ENDOWMENTS AND EXEMPTION

Considering the idea of a mandatory distribution requirement suggests
that this proposal is not a viable public policy response to the underlying
issue of affordable access to higher education. Whether Congress wishes to
make such distributions a condition for exemption in the case of those
colleges and universities that have endowments of any size is a different
matter and not one that has been the focus of this Article.
It is certainly unusual to introduce new ideas in a conclusion, but that
is where the analysis has lead. Any public policy response to a public
policy issue will necessarily involve government funding for student
financial assistance. The same is true for pursuit of universities' roles in
basic and applied research. Tuition cannot support universities, and
students should not be expected to pay the full cost of operating a
university that provides appropriate public benefits to many sectors of
society.
What one learns most clearly by considering endowments is that it is
time to reconsider what it means to treat both universities and hospitals as §
501(c)(3) organizations subject to the same legal regime as that applied to
all other public charities. Both are highly dependent on government
financing. Students could not pay tuition without government programs.
Universities could not meet their operating expenses without government
grants. Universities lobby actively for government funding. 53 Universities
are closer to parastatal enterprises than they are to traditional public
charities that receive contributions and provide public benefits to a
charitable class. It is time for the exempt status of universities (and
hospitals) to reflect this status. It is a far better use of the time and
resources of the tax-writing committees of Congress than crafting proposals
for mandatory distributions from endowments.

53. For a detailed account of lobbying by colleges and universities, see generally
ROBERT G. KAISER, So DAMN MUCH MONEY: THE TRIUMPH OF LOBBYING AND THE
CORROSION OF AMERICAN GovERNMENT (2009).

